July 23 2010 Ed Smith

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COUR STATE OF MONTANA 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 7 NO. DA 09-0501 8 9 THE STATE OF MONTANA, 10 APPELLANT'S REPLY Plaintiff/Appellee, BRIEF 11 and 12 KEVIN LEE CHRISTIANSEN, 13 Respondent/Appellant. 14 15 ON APPEAL FROM THE MONTANA TWELFTH JUDICIAL 16 DISTRICT COURT, HILL COUNTY, 17 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN C. MCKEON 18 APPEARANCES: 19

FOR THE A	PPELLANT:
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ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF "ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL," SET FORTH IN THE PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND WHICH IT PROVIDED AT THE EARLIER TRIAL OF THIS MATTER.

Although the State spends much of its time discussing a variety of cases, it ignores the most elementary components of this appeal. Ignoring these components is tantamount to a concession that they are insurmountable.

The State ignores the horrible confusion of the jury wrought by the District Court's erroneous instruction defining "actual physical control."

This is evidenced by the jury's repeated requests for additional assistance in determining what they were being told.

First, the jury posed:

Could you please give us a more clear definition of what physical control is?

What is the time line we should look at when considering physical control?

Second, the jury stated:

This is to notify you that the jury is split 6 to 6 and is unable to come to a unanimous decision.

Third, the jury stated:

We would like a copy of a legal dictionary brought to the Jury Room.

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Fourth, the jury asked:

May we please have the legal definition of domination and regulation?

Does 'present' & 'existing' mean at the time of the officer's arrival?

Fifth, the jury stated:

We were unable to come to a unanimous decision.

(DC Docket no. 116, Appendix E).

If substantial injustice does not result when jurors don't know the law they are asked to apply because it is horribly confusing, when does substantial injustice result?

Is it when a District Judge states during the first trial that the proper instruction on the law is the pattern jury instruction, and in the second trial, makes a complete reversal and states that the pattern jury instruction is confusing - even when the evidence presented in both trials was virtually the same?

Again, the State ignores this fact.

A close analysis of the testimony demonstrates that the facts presented in both trials were virtually the same. This was due to the fact that they were not contested.

What was hotly contested was how those facts fit with the law as drafted in the pattern jury

instructions, after this Court indicated that an instruction similar to the District Court's instant instruction was not "the most" clear or understandable. State v. Robison (Mont., 1997), 931 P.2d 706, 708.

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Consequently, there was absolutely no legal or factual justification to provide an instruction which was the law of the case, which the District Court stated was "the correct statement of the law ..."

(12/18/08 Tr. pg. 238, lns. 12-23).

And it must be pointed out, contrary to the State's assertion, it did not properly object to the pattern jury instruction it offered. The record is clear on this point.

Shortly before settling of instructions, the State indicated it wished the Court to provide the *Ruona* instruction. However, it never objected to the provision of the pattern jury instruction and never withdrew this instruction.

The State fails to provide any precedent, finding that a request to replace or supplement an instruction constitutes an objection to an instruction.

While the State claims Mr. Christiansen was not prejudiced because he was able to argue his theory, as it applied to the erroneous instruction, the State misses the obvious.

Presenting a defense theory to a law which is not understandable is like fitting a square peg in a round hole.

Mr. Christiansen is not asking anything more than a fair trial, where the jury understands the law, which has been approved of by this Court, and by the District Court in the first trial.

Finally, the State's closing comment in its brief is untrue and uncalled for. Mr. Christiansen did not concede every element required for conviction.

He vigorously contested the element of "actual physical control," and was, in fact, severely prejudiced by the District Court's erroneous instruction.

To say Mr. Christiansen was not prejudiced is disingenuous.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the erroneous instruction on "actual physical control," Mr. Christiansen was wrongfully convicted of DUI.

DATED this 22nd day of July, 2010.

Jeremy S. Yellin, Esq. Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 22^{nd} day of July, 2010, I served a copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF upon the following:

VIA U.S. MAIL Sheri K. Sprigg Assistant Attorney General Montana Attorney General's Office 215 North Sanders P.O. Box 201401 Helena, MT 59620-1401

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Esq.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Rule 27 of the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, I certify that this principal brief is printed with Courier monospaced typeface having 12 characters per inch; is double spaced except for footnotes and for quoted indented material, does not exceed 30 pages, excluding table of contents, table of citations, certificate of service and appendix.

Jeremy

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